Correct operation of an information system requires a balance ofcC~uretyy~ domains --access control (confidentiality), .integrity, utility, availability, and safety. However, traditional approaches provide little help on how to systematically analyze and balance the combined impact of surety requirements on a system. The key to achieving information system surety is identifying, prioritizing, and mitigating the sources of risk that may lead to system failure. Consequently, we propose a risk assessment methodology that provides a framework to guide the analyst in identifying and prioritizing sources of &k and selecting mitigation techniques. The framework leads the analyst to develop a risk-based system model for balancing the surety requirements and quantifying the effectiveness and combined impact of the mitigation techniques. Such a model allows the information system designer to make informed trade-offs based on the most effective risk-reduction measures.
Introduction
During recent years the medical indus.try_ has experienced a dramatic increase jn the use and -- increased use have come system failures causing the loss of money and..compomise of ''' ' information, and potentially endangering human life. The importance of ensuring correct system operation and understanding the risks of failures is increasing as well. After all, the overarching goal is to produce systems that do what they are supposed to do and not what they aren't supposed to do; that is, build the right thing, build it well, and protect it appropriately. To reach such a goal requires a dynamic, whole system, whole lifecycle perspective. 
DISCLAIMER

Information System Surety for Electronic Patient Records
The variety of uses for electronic patient records gives rise to many interesting and challenging information surety issues. While all of the surety domains defined above are important, the predominant surety concerns may vary depending upon the intended purpose and users of the system. Patient records systems, in general, may present surety concerns primarily related. to ensuring confidentiality, or controllig access. However, where systehisare'used to provide medical delivery, safety and avail;dbility-mslj; become tlie%vemdmg concerns. Informahan' ' intended for research or medical diagnosis must be guaranteed to be ofhigh'integri@, though immediate availability may not be critical. Financial (billing) systems must assume high data integrity, as well as availability and access control. For effective decision support, utility of the information is of utmost importance, as is availability when the decisions are made in real time. .., . * _ . _ A technique is needed that aids in identifying the most important surety issues given the specific use for which a system is intcnded. Sources of risk must be determined,_and potential consequences resulting from system failure must be identified and prioritized. Only then can decisions be stipported regarding how to mitigate risk and whether the remainingrisk ii? acceptable.
System View of Electronic Patient Records
A true system approach to surety for information systems must recognize that surety issues and resulting risks exist at several levels. The issues and risks must be identified, understood, and mitigated (or risks accepted) at each level and balanced within the system as a whole.
Surety issues must be determined and analyzed for data, applications, networking, communications, and system lifecycle, as well as subsystems. At issue is the idea of component surety vs. system surety; it is quite possible to achieve the former without the latter. For example, subsystems must be compatible and interoperate correctly in terms of surety policies for each subsystem, or appropriate system surety will not be achieved.
.. At the applications level, the database management systems must interoperate correctly not only to ensure that the data will be correct and complete, but also to pass on correctly the surety controls (e.g., authentication requirements and capabilities must match). Network protocols also must interoperate, functionally and in terms of surety controls. If labels are used to convey surety restrictions in one subsystem, the other subsystems must understand and implement the same restrictions.
If access time is important, all communications links must be within the most restrictive tolerance. Access control solutions may negatively affect performance, so a balance must be achieved. In a maintenance state of a system lifecycle, availability issues must be identified and planned for. If surety policies differ for subsystems at different sites, then the more restrictive site must take extra precautions (e.g.5 perhaps using a firewall). Even with similar policies, noncooperating solutions may be a probl9m: For instance; o~e site uses encryption but another does not, or one site controls access at the Ievel%f%kh%di&io%er at a data level. Indeed, if sites are located in different regulatory regions (e.g., states), policies may well vary greatly, and a great deal of analysis may be required to understand and mitigate risks for all sites.
Framework for Total Risk Assessment and Management
A dynamic. whole system, whole lifecycle perspective of risk demands a fiamework that does not reduce the problem simply to one of protecting assets (generally limited to dak@ hardware, and software). Additional considerations that must be addressed include areas such as: %ow to assess safety, how to give credit for thorough design practices, how to recognize the risk of running the software in unplanned environments, and how to balance competing requirements, such as availability and protection. The framework especially should not reduce the problem to mathematics on apples and oranges. Many risks are too disparate to be converted to a single comparable measure, like Annualized LOSS Expectancy in dollars. Loss of life simply cannot be measured on the same scale as hardware failure, but traditional risk assessment approaches often attempt to do just that. Real risks in real systems do not reduce to Annualized Loss Expectancy, and a single risk number is of little use anyway in improving the system. Current approaches typically address requirements in separate domains (e.g., access control a availability 91: integrity), and the combined impact on the system is not systematically considered. In addition, there is a tendency to focus on one area to the neglect of others (e.g., protecting against active threats and ignoring passive threats). Furthermore, the requirements are often developed based on a "checklist" mentality rather than an objective assessment of the surety objectives of a specific system.
To facilitate system-specific total risk assessment and management, a methodology must provide the system analyst or developer with: assistance in understanding and quantifying the effectiveness, dependencies, and interactions of mitigators (combined impact of each design alternative on correct system functioning vis a vis surety objectives AND aspects of the information system) 0 the ability to tailor the surety model to the specific system Our approach to assessing and managing risk in information systems provides this assistance through the following components:
Ariskmatrix The matrices are intended to guide the analyst in determining surety requirements, areas of highest consequence, and appropriate technologies or approaches to address risks. These preliminary matrices provide support for development of a model which can be analyzed. This paper will focus on the matrices of risks and risk mitigators. The modeling.method is described in detail elsewhere [SI.
Risk Matrix
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The risk matrix provides a taxonomy of risk sources for software-based systems. The matrix is used to determine surety requirements in terms of perceived risk and desired risk reduction, in the context of potential consequences and their relative importance.
The rows of the matrix (see Figure 2) represent the surety objectives, and the columns represent aspects of a system which might give rise to risks. The system aspects that we have chosen to consider deviate from the typical list consisting of things like information, software, hardware, network, and, perhaps, users. To address the goal of "correct operation of the system," we want to consider broader system aspects. Processes or transactions performed by the system can include concerns such as format, completeness, timing, and guaranteed delivery. System composition includes design, architecture, operatorher, networking, platform, and interoperability issues. System states include not only normal operations, but also maintenance, shutdown, and abnormal or unplanned events. And consideration of interfaces encourages a look at how the system actually functions in context. 
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Although the traditional impacts and assets are accommodated within this framework, it is much broader, giving rise to exploration of system dynamics (state changes), architecture choices (composition), and correct operation. For a particular system under analysis, the risk matrix will be pruned by the analyst to contain (and possible prioritize) only those risks of sufficient consequence and likelihood that they need to be mitigated. Figure 3 shows a risk matrix with some potential sources of risk filled in for an eppl?zystem; * in this case, a decision-support system'where a physician uses a distributed databGe system to find information on which to base treatment decisions. The analyst has determined that the primary surety objectives are: utility --the system must fit the intended purpose and perform correctly, 0 availability --the system must be available when the physician wishes to use it, and access time must meet certain criteria, and safety --the system must not function in such a way as to cause a decision that puts a patient's health at risk.
In this example, the analyst determines that the sources of risk that are of greatest concern are those in italics. For instance, utility is greatly affected by accidental modification of data, inappropriate processes and input, and update problems. The resulting risk mitigators matrix, Figure 4 , is populated with potential mitigation techniques for those risks.
Risk Mitigators Matrix
The risk mitigators matrix has the same format as the risk matrix, but the cells contain mitigators corresponding to sources of risk. The intent is that the mitigators not be limited to hardware and software technologies, but include rules and procedures, design and development practices, andcover the lifecycle spectrum. Thus credit can be given forusing &prijveii re%-timedesi@' .::;:(' architecture, for using a highly-rated s o h a r e development methodology, for a trusted path delivery mechanism, for fail-safe design, etc. The effectiveness of the mitigators can be evaluated in terms of several characteristics, such as the degree to which technoIogy vs. rules and procedures are involved, perceived strength, cost to implement, ease of use, outside dependencies, etc.
In our example, the availability risk relative to system composition due to single points of failure could be mitigated by redundancy in important (or less reliable) system components. A different type of risk, an inappropriate process causing a utility risk, would be addressed very differently. A mitigator might be to use a thoroughly tested process obtained fiom a reputable vendor. The effectiveness of this type of mitigator depends partly on how well we understand what the process will be expected to do, and how well it meets that need.
System Risk Model
The modeling approach combine&&pecG.of fault &e &dGvent4ree &&lysis iepie&$itc&r--visually by a directed graph. One way of diagramming the model is sCowYi in Figure 5 . A high-level system risk model is developed, using the risk matrix and the risk mitigators matrix; then the barriers are analyzed within the model; and then the analysis engine is run.
In the example shown in the figure, the risk being explored is loss of information utility in our decision-support system. This would be only a part of the system's total risk model. The analyst has deemed this risk to be high enough in likelihood and consequence to warrant this level of breakdown and analysis.
Barrier analysis is instantiation and refinement of a risk mitigator's ability to mitigate systemspecific risk, based upun several characteristics of the mitigator. In the example, preventing the user from accidentally altering data by requiring a visual scan relies entirely on rules and procedures, is not very strong, and is hard to use. Providing the user a "difi" tool is stronger technologically, easier to apply, and still has a rules-and-procedures component (the user must remember to use it). Providing some sort of automatic overwrite check is stronger yet, has even less of a rules-and-procedures component (the user must still respond appropriately), but may be implemented in such a way as to have a high annoyance factor which may cause the user to ultimately defeat it. All these considerations lead to an estimate of each.mitigator's:abi€ity:tb . reduce the likelihood of events tra%tioning ,. -to the -widesired .. state. .
The analysis engine must combine transition probabilities, threat estimates, barrier estimates, and risk reduction requirements to yield information on remaining risk. Uncertainty analysis must accompany the calculations, so that the engine can target highly uncertain calculations for refinement. The appropriate mathematics is a current subject of investigation for our project. . 5 We are developing s o h a r e tools to support the methodology. The tools will provide structure, organization of information, and visual guidance, as well as performing the analysis. The outcome of the process is an understanding and quantification of system-specific risk reduction in terms of the effectiveness and interactions of risk mitigators, and an understanding of the remaining risks.
Conclusion
Our literature search for journal articles, papers, and reports published in the past five years on computerized medical records systems found over one thousand documents on the topic. Quite surprisingly, no work was reported on the development of a risk managemerif framework for these systems, or even a risk analysis methodology to identify and prioritize risks. Furthermore, our review identified about 70 papers addressing computer security and cGnfidentiality as important issues, while hardly any addressed system availability or data integrity as explicit issues of concern. Although many health professionals believe that confidentiality is the main issue, data integrity and availability are just as important in the context of the "paperless" electronic record. Information should be complete and correct, available when needed, and accessed only by authorized persons. In the context of information surety, we haye presented a methodology that employs a whole systems approach to achieve a balance amondhe v&ous surety domains.
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The health care environment is characterized by an open nature of clinics that leaves them vulnerable to theft, damage, and unauthorized access. Disclosure of information may affect the patient's social standing as well as health. Some researchers feel that the health professions lack sufficiently well-defined organizational structure, culture, and perceptions to support security [2] . A whole systems approach to managing risk could help to define structure and change the culture and perceptions. 
